[sudoroom] A call to hackers everywhere

[Anthony Di Franco]

This was done many years ago by for example Rebecca Mercuri who advocated a
voter-verifiable but machine-readable paper audit trail (the Mercuri
method<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mercuri_method>
).
Her case for it is quite well thought-out and would make a good starting
point for further discussion of the topic.


On Thu, Nov 15, 2012 at 10:43 PM, Eddan Katz <eddan at eddan.com> wrote:

> Foul play has a long history in elections, and with paper too. But that's
> a different point.
>
> Do you think the voter should receive the paper receipt or that a paper
> receipt is printed out but kept at the voting location. If kept at the
> location, should the voter be able to review the printed copy before it is
> dropped into whatever box or container holds the paper trail votes?
>
> I learned that this turns out to be a crucial question for the blind
> advocates for voting rights, for whom electronic voting machines make it
> possible for them to vote for the first time in private and without any
> assistance. This issue in fact caused a major rift between traditional
> voting rights advocates and the digital rights community that I think is
> still yet to be repaired. Only after intensive coalition building efforts
> did groups like the NAACP, traditionally concerned about voting rights,
> finally came around to the digital rights criticism of EVMs.
>
> I would be interested in trying to work out a more nuanced position that
> can satisfy both the computer scientists and the blind community concerns.
> That seems like a very worthwhile Sudo Room project to me.
>
> -Eddan
>
> On Nov 15, 2012, at 7:26 PM, Jehan Tremback <jehan.tremback at gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
> > IMO, voting should not be done with out a paper trail. Preferably by
> hand. It's not that hard to color in little bubbles that a computer can
> read. If the ballots are unclear, then they should be redesigned. If some
> portion are unreadable by computer, they can be analyzed by humans.
> >
> > It's way too important of a process to be handled by the easily
> hackable, untested machines, made by members of one party or another. If
> there is foul play in a paper election, at least there is clear evidence
> (or evidence of destruction of evidence) to fall back on. With an
> electronic ballot, there is nothing.
> >
> > -Jehan
>
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