[hackerspaces] Wikileaks mass mirroring party
Justis Peters
justis.peters at gmail.com
Mon Dec 6 01:25:35 CET 2010
On 12/05/2010 04:39 PM, Bkay wrote:
> Digitally signing that content would not be a bad idea for those
> messages.... but which key to trust?
This could be a good fit for a "web of trust":
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Web_of_trust
With trust affirmed between enough nodes, you'll eventually have high
confidence that the keys you are trusting are held responsibly by the
same people you believe are holding them. Remember that trust is both
relative and subjective. There is no such thing as 100% trust and your
threshold of trust may differ significantly depending on the subject at
hand. With webs of trust, though, you can get some fairly high
confidence levels and you can help smooth out the inconsistencies in how
different people handle confirmation of identity and affirmation of trust.
If enough people try to build a web of trust that leads back to
WikiLeaks, we will soon have confidence that all our mirrors are
accurate and real releases from WikiLeaks. There are, however,
drawbacks. Every person who signs the keys could be considered a path
toward revealing the identity and/or location of WikiLeaks, their
employees, and their servers. It's difficult to balance both anonymity
and authenticity. Personally, I think that authenticity is one of the
most important parts of what WikiLeaks is trying to accomplish. That
said, I'm not Assange and can't speak to what it's like to be wanted by
Interpol.
Most likely, there is a middle ground that accomplishes enough
authenticity while still protecting a degree of anonymity. What does the
rest of the list think?
Kind regards,
Justis
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