[Hackupy-discuss] Dovetail protester communications system

[Eleanor Saitta]

On 2012.01.10 20.33, Joshua Marker wrote:
> Both points on the cryptography issue are good ones. On one hand, it is
> potentially dangerous to create a system that may, in some conceivable
> circumstances, be used by people to endanger themselves. On the other,
> people stuck in a dead radio zone in the US may opt to use this system,
> even without further cryptographic controls, to prevent arrests in the
> first place. As you say, they are not likely to be shot for it.
> Certainly there is a tension here between speed of development and
> features available. 

Getting security is right is actually the easy part, if you take it as
something which is necessary from the beginning.  The details of device
specific issues are actually a lot more time consuming, relatively speaking.

> (My own take is that the perfect is the enemy of the good - I wonder if
> it isn't a demand for every feature that is to blame for this fairly
> obvious idea not yet being implemented. This isn't because I don't feel
> the points Eleanor makes are real ones, just that I don't see them as
> sufficient to not implementing a smaller feature set, and I find the
> argument that a simpler app will be used by people to endanger
> themselves a bit /in loco parentis/.) I suppose the feature set of the
> first version of this tool is up to whoever finally gets it done.

Are you willing to take responsibility for the years of people's lives
which will be spent in prison when an application like this is used?

Would you like it if the people who designed your train control systems
took the same attitude?  "Hey, this is a cool new automatic braking
system has some really neat features, but there's no way we can make it
reliable, but hey, let's just release it now, and people can just decide
if they want to ride this train.  The average mass transit rider
understands the details of Scada reliability engineering and train
physics to make an informed decision whether to ride this train or not,
based on nothing but the marketing material from the transit agency, right?"

> Thanks for the info about Briar. It looks like a fantastic tool. It
> looks significantly fuller-featured than Dovetail, and based on trust
> networks as well. It will be interesting to see that in operation. The
> implementation of 'groups' or 'rooms' is an important one, I think - one
> that many people ask about. 
> 
> Thanks again, loving the input. I'll pass along choice stuff to them, as
> well, but if anyone is interested in talking with them more seriously to
> make this happen, please let me (or them) know. 

I'm planning on reaching out to them shortly to see if we can
coordinate.  I think there's a significant opportunity for collaboration
here, and I really hope we can work together to build something that
gives people the tools they need communicate while staying safe.

E.

-- 
Ideas are my favorite toys.



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