<div class="gmail_quote">On Mon, Dec 27, 2010 at 3:45 PM, Daniel Grushkin <span dir="ltr"></span>wrote:<br><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="border-left: 1px solid rgb(204, 204, 204); margin: 0pt 0pt 0pt 0.8ex; padding-left: 1ex;">
<p>Check out the article: “<a href="http://www.sciencemag.org/content/330/6012/1766.full" target="_blank">Science,
Law Enforcement Build Biotech Bridges</a>.”</p></blockquote></div><br>"""
<br>Science, Law Enforcement Build Biotech Bridges<div id="sec-4" class="subsection">
<div style="width: 300px;" id="F2" class="fig pos-anchor type-figure nonresearch-content even">
<div style="width: auto;" class="fig-inline"><img style="width: auto;" alt="Figure" src="http://www.sciencemag.org/content/330/6012/1766/F2.medium.gif"></div>
<div style="width: auto;" class="fig-caption">
<p id="p-19" class="first-child">Genspace President Ellen Jorgensen (<em>left</em>) and FBI Supervisory Special Agent Edward H. You (<em>right</em>).
</p>
</div>
</div>
<p id="p-20">With
scientists working to create new life forms and amateur biology clubs
springing up nationwide, it stands to reason that the U.S. security
community would be concerned that one rogue researcher or one innocent
error might create a grave problem. </p>
<p id="p-21">But
before uneasiness could turn to conflict, the FBI, working closely with
AAAS, embraced a new strategy. The Bureau held conferences with
university and private sector researchers, attended synthetic biology
science fairs, and spent time with do-it-yourself (DIY) biologists. The
message, though tailored for each audience, was consistent. </p>
<p id="p-22">"We
want science and security communities to come to an understanding to
promote a culture of responsibility," says Edward H. You, an
experienced researcher and now the FBI supervisory special agent
guiding the outreach effort. By bringing those communities together,
"we can…identify what some of the risks and gaps might be, and then
come up with strategies that make sense to both communities to mitigate
those risks and gaps." </p>
<p id="p-23">A
certain amount of uneasiness was inevitable after the deadly blitz of
anthrax letters that followed the 9/11 terror attacks and, more
recently, the stunning advances and increasing accessibility of biotech
research. In research published last May in <em>Science</em>, genomics pioneer J. Craig Venter announced development of the first cell controlled by a synthetic genome. That breakthrough
underscored that biotech will likely create unpredictable implications for science and society.
</p>
<p id="p-24">In
a recent appearance at AAAS, bioethicist Thomas H. Murray said
synthetic biology—fundamentally altering life or creating new life
forms—offers "mind-boggling" possible benefi ts, from production of new
pharmaceuticals to cleaning up oil spills. But, he added, the benefi ts
must be weighed against bioterrorism and other hard-to-define risks. </p>
<p id="p-25">"If
I didn’t think the potential benefits . . . were massive, there would
be no point in having this conversation," said Murray, president and
chief executive officer of the Hastings Center, in the annual
AAAS-Hitachi Lecture on Science & Society on 28 October. </p>
<p id="p-26">Finding
the best balance of benefits and risks is the rationale for the
collaboration between the FBI and AAAS, said AAAS biosecurity expert
Kavita Berger, an associate program director in the Center for Science,
Technology and Security Policy. </p>
<p id="p-27">Just
a few years ago, Berger contributed to a survey of researchers that
found only a third were comfortable sharing their research with agents,
and a mere 14% felt comfortable with the FBI having a role in
monitoring research. </p>
<p id="p-28">But if science and security couldn’t build a working relationship, she thought, then policy-makers, acting out of mistrust
or fear, might impose rules that impede research without affecting real security concerns.
</p>
<p id="p-29">Collaboration, she said, is "ultimately going to be a lot more productive and a lot more useful in reaching the end goals
of security and science."
</p>
<p id="p-30">In
professional conferences organized by the FBI and AAAS, You and Berger
have had agents and researchers work through simulated problems related
to biotech and biosecurity. In the process, they learned about each
other’s values, perspectives, and practices. </p>
<p id="p-31">Now
the uneasiness is giving way to closer interaction between researchers
and law enforcement, with major universities offering to host the
conferences. "We’re seeing a paradigm shift," said You, who had worked
in gene therapy and cancer research before joining the FBI. </p>
<p id="p-32">AAAS
is helping forge a similar relationship with amateur biologists, who
number an estimated 4000 or more nationwide. An informal meeting this
fall brought three of them together with You and others from the FBI,
along with government and AAAS officials. The DIY speakers described
how a love of science and commitment to public engagement has led them
to hold exhibits at street fairs and form community labs. </p>
<p id="p-33">Ellen
Jorgensen, an assistant professor in pathology at New York Medical
College and president of the Genspace community lab in New York City,
acknowledged that cooperation with agents does not come easily for many
in the DIY movement. </p>
<p id="p-34">But,
she said, "I think that the meetings we have had were very useful in
terms of fostering some trust between the FBI and the DIY biocommunity
. . . To kill a movement that embodies a reawakened public enthusiasm
about science due to concerns about biosecurity would be a terrible
shame." </p>
<p id="p-35"><em>—Brian Vastag contributed to this report.</em></p><p id="p-35"><em>"""<br></em></p>
</div><br clear="all"><br>-- <br>- Bryan<br><a href="http://heybryan.org/">http://heybryan.org/</a><br>1 512 203 0507<br>